Saturday, October 15, 2011

New Data on Bankers' Risk Aversion


-->
Probably the most controversial claim of the book will prove to be our suggestion that the behavior of bankers before the crisis was actually risk averse, at least in the aggregate. (A key point of Chapter 4, however, is that there was considerable heterogeneity underneath these aggregates.)

The risk-aversion claim rests on two facts: the much-higher-than-legally required capital ratios of commercial banks and savings and loans before the crisis; and the fact that commercial banks and S&Ls overwhelmingly bought the least lucrative and supposedly “safest” mortgage-backed securities: those implicitly guaranteed by the federal government through Fannie and Freddie’s congressional charters; and those rated AAA vs. those rated AA or lower.

Lower-paying bonds pay higher yields than higher-rated bonds, which in turn pay higher yields than “agency” (Fannie/Freddie) bonds. Reckless, greedy bankers should not have bought agencies or AAA bonds; they should have bought BB or BBB bonds.

In Table 2.2 of the book, we claim that banks bought more than twice the quantity of agency bonds as AAA mortgage bonds, and four times the quantity of AAA mortgage bonds as AAA CDOs. CDOs usually tranched mezzanine (sub-AAA) tranches of “regular” mortgage bonds, i.e., private-label mortgage-backed securities (PLMBS), so AAA CDOs were objectively riskier than AAA PLMBS. Thus, one way to view the collective risk profile of U.S. banks and savings and loans is to recognize that the following list shows the least risky and least lucrative of their mortgage bond holdings first, with the riskiest and most lucrative last:

$852 billion in agency bonds
$383 billion in AAA private-label mortgage-backed securities
$90 billion in AAA CDOs

Those are the figures on which row 1 of our Table 2.2 are based. However, none of our tables show bank holdings of actual AA, A, BBB, or BB tranches of PLMBS or CDOs. This is because our data on the distribution of the various types of mortgage bond in banks’ portfolios came from a famous Lehman Brothers study dated April 11, 2008: “Residential Credit Losses—Going into Extra Innings?” (We discuss this study in end note 1 to the conclusion of the book.) The Lehman figures assign PLMBS and CDO holdings by various types of investor (commercial banks and S&Ls, investment banks, hedge funds, etc.) by billions of dollars. But the 2008 Lehman table says that commercial banks held no PLMBS or CDOs rated lower than AAA. That seems implausible, unless the authors of the report could not find holdings totaling more than $500 million, so the figure got rounded down to zero billions of dollars. (We attempted to contact the authors of the report, but they all now work for hedge funds and are barred from communicating with members of the public.)

The Lehman figures have been widely cited by others (e.g., Arvind Krishnamurthy, “The Financial Meltdown: Data and Diagnoses”--download PDF--Table 1 [November 2008]; Viral Acharya and Matthew Richardson, Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System [2008], Table 5). They are more comprehensive and newer than the only comparable data source, a 2007 Lehman Brothers report entitled “Who Owns Residential Credit Risk” (cited by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “Preliminary Staff Report: Securitization and the Mortgage Crisis” [April 2010], Table 1). However, we wish there were a better source. Unfortunately, as of November 2010, when our book was completed, we knew of no other data. Now (ht Viral Acharya) we do—although this source, too, has limitations.

In August 2011, Isil Erel, Taylor D. Nadauld, and René M. Stulz released an NBER working paper, “Why Did U.S. Banks Invest in Highly Rated Securitization Tranches?” Erel et. al found a way to use regulatory filings from bank holding companies to “back out” their holdings of asset-backed securities, including mortgage bonds.

The key data source, Schedule HC-R of form FR Y-9C, groups assets by risk bucket: 0%, 20%, 50%, 100%. This means that AAA and AA PLMBS, which were both risk weighted at 20%, are grouped together. And the 100% category contains so many different types of securities, such as corporate bonds and equities, that we cannot back out mortgage bonds in that category, namely those rated BBB or BB. Using Erel et al.’s method, however, we are able to provide the following results for the four biggest bank holding companies as of the end of 2006:

Citigroup:
$70 billion in agency bonds
$28 billion in AAA/AA ABS
$10 billion in A-rated ABS

Bank of America:
$157 billion in agency bonds
$4 billion in AAA/AA ABS
$2 billion in A-rated ABS

JPMorganChase:
$75 billion in agency bonds
$1 billion in AAA/AA ABS
$0 billion ($351 million) in A-rated ABS

Wells Fargo:
$27 billion in agency bonds
$27 billion in AAA/AA ABS
$1 billion in A-rated ABS

Aggregate:
$329 billion in agency bonds
$60 billion in AAA/AA ABS
$13 billion in A-rated ABS

In short, the Big Four invested in the safest two classes of asset-backed securities securities, agency mortgage bonds and AAA/AA-rated ABS, at a ratio of 28:1 compared to the riskiest, most lucrative category for which we have figures: A-rated ABS. One should keep in mind that, for example, in mid-2006, agencies paid a 9-bps spread over Treasuries, AAA mortgage bonds paid 18 bps, AA mortgage bonds paid 32 bps, and A mortgage bonds paid 54 bps (Ashcraft and Schuermann, "Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit," p. 28, Table 16). Reckless, greedy bankers should have bought As--or lower-rated mortgage bonds (BBBs paid 154 bps, and BBB- paid 267 bps) every time--never agencies, AAAs, or AAs.

However, do the new data mean that the Lehman figures on which we relied are wrong, for showing zero (or less than $500 million) in sub-AAA mortgage-bond holdings among commercial banks and savings and loans? Not necessarily. The figures above are from the consolidated regulatory filings of bank holding companies, which include investment-banking arms. The Lehman figures do show $24 billion in sub-AAA bonds among investment banks. Moreover, the data above cover all ABS, including credit-card ABS, auto-loan ABS, student-loan ABS, and more exotic categories, not just mortgage ABS.

As for the data, then, we conclude that the full story remains to be told, but that our basic point stands: the bankers—even at Citigroup, which had the riskiest portfolio—were not behaving in patterns we would expect from reckless greedheads.

14 comments:

Vuk Vukovic said...

Mr Friedman, Mr Kraus,
allow me to extend my congratulations on a well formed argument on what actually caused the financial crisis.

I was inspired by your joint article "A Silver Lining to the Financial Crisis" and prof. Friedman's article "A Crisis of Politics not Economics" which have helped me to realize the dangers of regulatory failures and artificial demand created for the MBSs which led to the housing bubble.
I have published a paper on the crisis myself which you may access at my blog (I posted a summary of the paper):
http://im-an-economist.blogspot.com/p/financial-crisis-2007-2009.html

I have quoted your articles to support my argument on the regulatory confinements behind the crisis. I hope your book brings even more surprising and interesting insights, such as the ones you posted on this blog.

I also have to commend you on the argument on 'greedy bankers' and the way you prove that they invested only into the safest assets, so there was no sign of reckless behaviour.

Keep up the excellent work and I'm looking forward to reading more of your blog posts and papers on the crisis.

Dean Croshere said...

The analysis is particularly interesting, but I think it ignores the most important question: Why was incredibly risky debt packaged together as AAA/Safe debt?

Were the bankers complicit in the ratings agencies failure to properly evaluate the risk level of sub-prime CDOs?

Perhaps you cover this in the book, which I have not yet read. If bankers were involved in making high risk investments into low risk investments, then buying a lot of that supposedly-but-not-really low risk investment doesn't make them risk averse.

BradyDale said...

It's a great point, but it seems to me the real risk that everyone was averse to was missing the gains all their friends were making. They were following the herd because the herd was, for now, making money. So, if they could follow it using something Moody's was dumb enough to call safe, so much the better.

Further, no matter what way you slice it, it's hard to say that any institution that was willing to give out a credit default swap (that's the name of the big insurance policy, right?), was risk averse. That's the big sack of crazy that made all this nuttiness possible. How could any institution insure for billions and billions... when the downside risk was so huge?

That was crazy and it was pure greed. They did it because they had convinced themselves that they would never have to pay and so by taking the "risk" on they were making suckers of their clients, because it was all free money (unless the big one ever hit).

stuart gorrez said...

What a great content on risk aversion topic. This is such a challenging topic and I am really glad to find out this fabulous website.
Get your coursework written professional authors
dissertation writing services online

Anonymous said...

To simplicity your psyche, clubhouse utilize a protected server that exchanges any money rapidly and effortlessly, and for the most part doesn't shop any particular facts and figures where it might be profited entrance to by distinct clients. slot games

Tome mark said...

human race War Z is told from beginning to end UN Postwar fee agency brook all through a succession of interview. Patient none in the zombie pandemic is a juvenile boy in ceramic who is bitten 老虎机 the supreme source of the outbreak continues unidentified. The Chinese try to cover up the zombie pandemic at first, coming up with a cover article of a urgent situation in Taiwan.

Tome mark said...

I am very happy to read this. This is the kind of casino spiele manual that yearns to be allocated and not the random misinformation that's at the other blogs

Tome mark said...

spectacular paid work with the blog. I do akin to your solid toil and will stay for essay writing more dispatched remarks from you as dispatched remarks supplied me joyfulness and pledges some assists to do identical work right here. Thanks a allotment

maksumul shahed said...

You’ve got some interesting points in this article.I am sure that the visual effects works are going to get you a lot of fans. Thanks for sharing the updated, links and information. Keep posting more……buy gift cards

Speicher Spe said...

Has been a long-standing disceptation in health political economy. However, past studies might underestimate the scale of SID since it's by trial and error troublesome to isolate If you want appropriate information about inversion tables reviews please feel free to visit our site.

Tome mark said...

This kind has a number of gigantic publication, which journey roughly the idea that humankind won't eternally have the sun on his back, his crop high, onlinecasino 777
his treasury full and his outlook chart out. being being are and habitually have been disputed by natural disaster and catastrophes of our own making.

Tome mark said...

This piece was made by the best scribe present today. Why am I saying this? Not because I want likes. NO. Because, it's the truth. I have not ever glimpsed a piece of this high worth as this one. So, that is why I resolved my attitude to you.Payment Processing Solutions

Tome mark said...

I've be accouterment up for Noncriminal and adamant to draw to a adequate up all my backward assignment eventually than it start. regrettably, I hit a bait of a 'procrastination partition' the latest past. The accomplished day was bang and I didn't do no affair which productive. So at the burning I'm chugging coffee and cursing myself. admiration to glimpse how you can appetite the identical destiny? Read on... Phoenix Window Treatments

william max said...

Inside interim, this ready activity has ended to a higher week’s Federal government Arrange achieving. The main YOU fiscal data credited Peoria Blinds this specific few days add some industry general shortage along with the ABC news client self-confidence index nowadays; This Home finance loan Bankers Association’s house loan applications time frame tomorrow.